Influence of Opinion Dynamics on the Evolution of Games by Gargiulo, Floriana & Ramasco, José J.
Influence of Opinion Dynamics on the Evolution of
Games
Floriana Gargiulo1, Jose´ J. Ramasco2*
1Centre d’Analyse et de Mathe´matique Sociales CAMS, CNRS, Paris, France, 2 Instituto de Fsica Interdisciplinar y Sistemas Complejos IFISC (CSIC-UIB), Palma de Mallorca,
Spain
Abstract
Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which
strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by
observing own or others payoff results but can be also modified after interchanging impressions with other players. In this
way, the update of the strategies can become a question that goes beyond simple evolutionary rules based on fitness and
become a social issue. In this work, we explore this scenario by coupling a game with an opinion dynamics model. The
opinion is represented by a continuous variable that corresponds to the certainty of the agents respect to which strategy is
best. The opinions transform into actions by making the selection of an strategy a stochastic event with a probability
regulated by the opinion. A certain regard for the previous round payoff is included but the main update rules of the
opinion are given by a model inspired in social interchanges. We find that the fixed points of the dynamics of the coupled
model are different from those of the evolutionary game or the opinion models alone. Furthermore, new features emerge
such as the independence of the fraction of cooperators with respect to the topology of the social interaction network or
the presence of a small fraction of extremist players.
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Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has been introduced as a framework
to study the processes of selection of genes or behaviors in
biological and social systems [1–3]. Its aim is to characterize the
choices in terms of strategies of individuals of a population playing
a game. A particular strategy generates a payoff to the individual
playing it that depends on the selection of the rest of individuals.
The key assumption of the evolutionary theory is that the fitness of
an individual to reproduce directly relates to the payoff obtained
[1]. Consequently, most successful strategies in terms of payoff are
also those that multiply faster and can eventually become
dominant after some generations.
These ideas find an analytical expression in the form of the so-
called replicator equation [4–6]. If xi stands for the fraction of
individuals in the population playing strategy i, fi(~x) for their
payoff and f (~x) for the average payoff over all the population, the
replicator equation reads
dxi
dt
~xi fi(~x){f (~x)
 
: ð1Þ
The fixed points and limit cycles of the equation define the final
state of the system regarding the distribution of strategies in the
population [3–5,7]. Moreover, the study of the stability of the
solutions, particularly if they are formed by single strategies, to
invasion by other strategies motivates the definition of evolu-
tionary stables strategies (ESS) [7]. To illustrate the predictions of
this approach, one can consider the social dilemmas such as the
public goods game or the prisoner’s dilemma. In these games,
each individual must choose between collaborating with her
partners getting a intermediate value of the payoff or to defect
and try to take advantage of those partners that are collaborating
to gain a higher payoff. Despite collaboration is beneficial to the
population as a whole, the egoist inclination of each single
individual to maximize her payoff leads to generalized defection
as the replicator equation predicts since this is the only stable
solution [3,4].
This result can seem a little drastic especially when considered
in the light of everyday experience in human societies or the
known behavior of social animals. Different mechanisms have
been proposed to explain how the collaboration levels can increase
in a population. One is, for instance, taking into account the finite
and discrete character of the individuals in the population. This
point goes beyond the assumptions of the continuous theory and
provide thus a escape door to obtain more collaboration or even to
the invasion of collaborative individuals in a full-defect population
[8–10]. However, its efficiency as an explanation does not extend
to large systems since the probability of survival or invasion of
collaborative strategies decreases fast with the population size.
Other possibility that has been theoretically discussed is that
structured populations may increase collaboration. Geographical
extended systems simulated using spatial lattices show a remanent
level of collaboration [11–14] and even chaotic patterns separating
areas of collaborating and defecting individuals [11]. The structure
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of social networks enhances collaboration via the heterogeneity of
individual roles that the different positions in the network produce
[15–20]. Also random mutations or the individuals’ free explora-
tion to search for a best response to the strategies of their
counterparts are another element that can promote collaboration
[13,21–24]. Finally, the fixed points of the system dynamics,
including the level of cooperation, are affected too by the way in
which the system updates either by taking into account discrete
versus continuous dynamics [25,26] or by altering the update rules
[27–30].
In this work, we explore a mechanism that can also play an
important role to raise collaboration levels in social systems. The
basic idea goes back to the fact that humans not always take the
most rational option when presented with a dilemma [31–33].
This has been observed in experiments in controlled environ-
ments in which participants, in general students, were playing
Prisoner’s dilemma [34–39]. Also, in other level, it is a well
known behavior in the world of finances where decisions on
buying and selling can be taken based on rumors or on a general
state of opinion about the possibilities of an investment [40]. Our
proposal is to increase the dimensionality of the system by noting
that the opinion on which is the best strategy is an important
variable to incorporate, even though in some cases such belief
can be wrong or baseless with respect to actual performance in
the game. The evolution of the system includes thus a purely
social ingredient related to opinion formation [41] followed by a
process of decision taking that relies on the formed opinion. In
the abstract representation of Equation (1), the addition of a
variable of opinion can be modeled as
dxi
dt
~g(wj ,xi),
dwj
dt
~h(~w,~x),
ð2Þ
where the index describing the opinion j can be continuous or,
as in this example, discrete, wj represents the fractions of
individuals holding opinion j, g() is a function that relates the
opinion j with the probability of playing strategy i and the
function h() describes the evolution of the opinions given the
state of the system and the outcome of the game. The addition of
the new field w corresponding to the opinions of the individuals
and the new rules of update given by the interchange of opinions
between individuals can lead to extremely different fixed points
and solutions for this system. In the following, we provide an
example with a simple model that shows how these ideas can be
implemented in practice and how the dynamic and stationary
predictions of evolutionary game theory can dramatically change
due to the coupling between opinion and games.
Model
We take as basis a well-known model for opinion dynamics, the
Deffuant model [42], and a game inspired by the dilemma of the
tragedy of commons [43,44]. The opinion in the Deffuant model is
described by a continuous variable w between {1 and 1.
Considering a population of N agents, each one placed on a
node of a network, the update of opinions is carried out by
randomly choosing an agent i and one of her neighbors j and
comparing their opinions at time t, wi and wj . If Dwi{wj DvE, the
interaction occurs and the new opinions are given by
wi(tz1)~wizm(wj{wi),
wj(tz1)~wjzm(wi{wj):
ð3Þ
Otherwise, if the difference between wi and wj is larger than E,
there is no interaction. The parameter m is the so-called
convergence parameter since it regulates to which new value the
opinions converge after interaction. In this work, we set it at
m~1=2 which implies that the final opinion is the average over
both agents opinion. The Deffuant’s model shows bounded
confidence in the sense that interactions between agents whose
opinions are further apart than E are forbidden. The value of E is
thus a key parameter to take into account in the following study.
For the game, we consider a simple set of rules that permit the
exploration of a dilemma and a harmony scenario by tuning a
single parameter. This allows us to show the validity of our
findings regardless of the game’s ESS. In the rules every time that
an agent i plays, she does so with all her ki neighbors. An unit of
wealth is then distributed among all of them. If everybody
cooperates then the payoff is 1=ki for each agent. Otherwise, each
defector is given priority and takes a portion p as payoff. If the total
amount requested by the defectors, pnDi , is larger than 1 nobody
takes anything. On the contrary, if pnDi ƒ1, the cooperators evenly
divide the remaining 1{pnDi . Note that for low values of p,
pv1=ki , collaboration is the strategy with the largest payoff and in
a pure evolutionary framework becomes the only survival. The
same occurs on the other extreme for high values of p, strictly
speaking for pw1 defection has a zero payoff. In the area of
intermediate p values, the equilibrium of our system is equivalent
to that of the public goods game and show the effects of the
tragedy of commons dilemma because defection is the most
advantageous strategy but if every agent opts for it none of them
get any payoff [43,44].
After describing the opinion dynamics and the game rules, it is
important to explain how both are coupled. As illustrated in
Figure 1, the two extremes of the opinion variable w are identified
with the strategies D and C. w represents thus the opinion of the
agents about which is the best strategy to win the game. The pass
from an agent’s opinion to real action is taken by assuming a
probability pC~(1zw)=2 of playing C and
pD~1{pC~(1{w)=2 of choosing D. It is important to stress
that the game is actually played in a mixed strategy framework and
that this way of implementing opinion and action is assuming
incomplete information, actions based on impressions and a social
component in the way the players move towards the selection of a
strategy. In practice, the model is updated by choosing a random
agent i in each time step, then she plays the game with her
neighbors and after this her opinion is updated depending on the
earned payoff. For updating the opinions, a neighbor of i, j, is
randomly selected and the new opinions are calculated using
Deffuant’s model of Eq. (3) only if j’s payoff is equal or higher than
i’s. Note that only i’s opinion is updated, which introduces an
asymmetry in Deffuant’s rules. This asymmetry prevents players
that are doing better from changing opinion due to interactions
with others performing worse, and it also breaks the strong
conservation of the average opinion that is a feature of the original
Deffuant’s model.
Results
Let us start by considering a mean-field situation in which in
each time step a randomly selected agent interacts with a group
formed by four other agents chosen at random. The first results
Opinion Dynamics and Evolution of Games
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can be seen in Figure 2 where the average opinion SwT and the
average fraction of cooperators fC are displayed as a function of
time. The curves of different colors correspond to three values of p:
p~0:1, p~0:4 and p~0:8. For games with 5 participants,
cooperation C is the most advantageous strategy below
pv1=5~0:2. In general if the number of players per game is n,
the particular value of p for which C is the best strategy is given by
pv1=n. Similar results to those described next are found for any
value of n as long as the values of p are consistently updated. The
blue curves (p~0:1) correspond thus to a harmony game, where
the C strategy becomes prevailing in the system from an
evolutionary perspective. This is actually the outcome when the
state of the system is updated following a replicator dynamics (see
plots on the left column of Figure 2). Otherwise, for pw0:2, the
replicator dynamics results in a final state formed mainly by
defectors. The update based only on the opinion dynamics,
without allowing any coupling between the payoff of the game and
the update of the opinions, leads to the selection of a few opinion
values. These values of w are separated more than 2E and depend
on the model initial conditions. The variability of the initial
conditions causes the slight dispersion in the distributions P(w).
This is the known final state for the Deffuant model [41,42].
More interestingly, the combination of both game and opinion
dynamics on the right-hand plots produces a final state that does
not correspond with any of the fixed points of the uncoupled
dynamics. Although the defectors are still a minority for p~0:1
and a majority for the other values of p, the dispersion of opinions
is noticeable and a small reservoir of agents with opinion opposite
to the majority remains. The origin of this small group of agents
lies in the difference between the social and the evolutionary
dynamics. Bounded confidence prevents the interaction of agents
with very different opinion regardless of their difference in payoff.
The members of the small group of roguish agents can play with
any other agent but they only update their opinion when
confronted with their own peers. This behavior would be
eliminated in an evolutionary framework, where the payoff and
the fitness are strictly related but this is not necessarily the case in a
social environment. Actually, this kind of stubbornness against
facts has been observed in behavioral economics where persons
are asked to play a repeated Prisoner’s dilemma. A fraction of the
participants opted for pure defection or even pure collaboration
despite the existence of more advantageous strategies such as tip
for tap or a Markovian response [35,36,38,39]. These experiments
also show a continuous strategy exploration by the participants
that may not be so certain of their own choices.
The fact that the small group of contrarian players dissolves
when the social constraints are relaxed can be observed in Figure 3.
In the plot A), the distribution of agents’ opinions is displayed for
different values of the bound confidence parameter . If E is very
low there is very few interaction between agents and therefore the
opinions remain frozen in the initial condition, which is an
uniform distribution. When E increases, the agents are able to
interact with other players holding very different opinions. This
leads to the convergence of opinions to values close to the extreme
w~{1, which corresponds to pure defection and that in the
dilemma with evolutionary dynamics is the only ESS. The players
recognize thus defection as the most adequate strategy in the limit
E?2 but due to the stochastic nature of the relation between
opinions and action are not able to reach w~{1. These results
are stable within each of the two games to the variation of the
values of the portion taken by the defectors p. The average fraction
of cooperators fC can be seen in Figure 3B as a function of p. For
all the values of E, a change can be observed in p~0:2 coinciding
with the modification of the nature of the game from harmony to a
dilemma. Apart from this, some minor corrections are seen due to
the discreteness of the group of players. Since only 5 players are
considered in each round and if nD stands for the number of
defectors in a round, the total payoff reserved for the defectors is
nDp. If this amount goes over the unit neither defectors or
collaborators get any payoff. Therefore, the maximum number of
defectors that a round can sustain comply with the relation
nDpw1. The values of p coinciding with 1=nD mark thus a change
on the payoff partition in the game. A final detail that we also
wanted to explore here is the stability of the solutions if the total
wealth is taken as main factor of the opinion update instead of the
instantaneous payoff. The use of the total wealth adds a more
consistent memory effect since the choice of a successful strategy
allows for a continuous income. Still the players are able to
recognize the optimal strategy for large values E, but it is important
to note the large dispersion of opinions and the peak around
w&{0:3 far from the extreme w~{1. Also the stability of the
system with p becomes altered with more violent bumps in fC
when p passes through the fractional values modifying the payoff
partition.
A simplistic mean-field configuration is not a valid match to the
more complicated structure that social interactions can present.
The social interactions are normally modeled as network whose
vertices and edges represent individuals and social relations,
respectively. In theoretical works, it has been shown that the
topological characteristics of such networks can affect the game
outcome increasing, for instance, the level of cooperation in the
Prisoner’s dilemma [16,18,19]. However, experimental results
where real individuals play the Prisoner’s dilemma with different
network topologies contradict this conclusion since the level of
cooperation seems to be similar for different network topologies
[35–39]. The explanation provided for this effect is the presence of
the so-called moody conditional cooperators: individuals that take their
strategic decisions regarding cooperation or defection based on
their previous experience as much as on their neighbors’ payoff.
The results of our model point in the same direction with a very
weak dependence on the topology of the interaction networks as
can be seen in Figure 4. In order to introduce different interaction
topologies, we run the model on a 2D square lattice, on Erdo¨s-
Renyi (ER) graphs [45] and on Barabasi-Albert (BA) scale-free
networks [46]. The ER and BA graphs are particular types of
complex networks with different level of heterogeneity in the
Figure 1. Sketch showing the coupling between the opinion
variable w and the probability of opting for one of the
two strategies in the game collaboration (C) or defec-
tion (D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048916.g001
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number connections of the nodes (degree, k). For ER, the
distribution of degrees is Poissonian centered around the average
SkT, while for the BA the distribution of degree is a power-law
decaying function with exponent {3, P(k)~k{3. In each case, an
agent plays each round of the game with her nearest neighbors
alone. In Fig. 4A, the fraction of cooperators fC is displayed as a
function of the parameter p for different network topologies and
E~1=2. The fraction of cooperators is not very sensitive to the
topology. One can find a stronger difference in the distribution of
opinions as can be seen in Figure 4B and C, where it can be seen
that a model with random interactions or scale-free networks have
more marked peaks. We have also explored the spatial distribution
of opinions and strategies when the game is played in a 2D square
lattice with 4 neighbors per node (Fig. 4D and E). As occurs with
the Prisoner’s dilemma in replicator dynamics [11], the reduced
dimensionality allows for the formation of clusters of agents with
close opinions playing similar strategies. The local character of the
interactions makes that clusters of collaborators can survive. In
Figure 4, we explore also the effect that the heterogeneity in the
Figure 2. Time evolution of the average opinion and of the fraction of agents playing collaborate (fC) for the replicator
dynamics, the opinion dynamics alone and the coupled dynamics of game and opinion. The results are shown for three
different values of the parameter p: 0:1, 0:4 and 0:8. Note that C is the most advantageous strategy for pv0:2, while the game becomes a dilemma
for pw0:2. The bottom plots show the probability density for the opinion of the agents at the last time of simulation. The simulations are run with a
value of E~1=2 and a population of N~5000 agents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048916.g002
Figure 3. Distribution of agent opinions and the average fraction of collaborators fC as a function of p for different values of the
bounding parameter E. In the first plots, A) and B), the opinion update is based on the payoff obtained in the last round of the game, while in C)
and D) is based on the accumulated wealth. In A) and C), p~0:8. The total population in the simulations is N~5000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048916.g003
Opinion Dynamics and Evolution of Games
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degree of the agents in the social networks can have on the
opinion. The agents’ opinion in an instance and the average
opinion over many realizations is displayed as a function of the
agents degree (plots F and G). The average opinion tends to be
more negative, closer to defection, for better connected agents
regardless of the particular characteristics of the network. Even
though all the results shown in Figs. 2–5 are for systems of
approximately 1000 agents, we have explored larger systems and
networks. For instance, for systems with 10000 agents the
dynamics becomes slower but the main features such as opinion
distributions, fraction of cooperators and formation of domains in
lattices are maintained in the stationary regime.
A final aspect of the model that we analyze is the effect that a
small fraction of radical agents can have on the opinion and
strategies played by the rest of the population. There are two
precedents that justify the concern with the role that the extremists
can play. One is the existence of such radical individuals playing
always the same strategies either cooperation or defection in the
experiments [38,39]. The second is that the effect of extremists,
who go under the name of contrarians or zealots in the literature,
is well known in the opinion dynamic models [47–49] or even in
the evolution of games [50,51]. A small fraction of extremists can
drive the system out of consensus. The fraction of cooperators
obtained with the model as a function of p and the opinion
distribution for p~0:8 are depicted in Figure 5. The curves for the
model with a fraction of extremists of 5% either of players C or D
are over-imposed to the baseline without extremists. As can be
seen, the average fraction of collaborators fC is weakly dependent
on the presence of extremists or zealots. Apart from a slight shift
due to the additional 5% players of pure strategies, no major
change is observed. However, the same cannot be said regarding
the opinion distributions. Both models with extremists show
different distributions even though the effect is more dramatic if
the zealots are playing ‘‘defect’’.
Discussion
In summary, we have introduced a model that couples opinion
dynamics and strategies selection in a game. Our main assump-
tions are that the agents have not certainty on which strategy is
optimal and that they form an opinion on this issue which can be
Figure 4. Influence of the topology of the interaction network on the outcome of the game. In A), the fraction of collaborators fC as
function of the parameter p. In B) and C) the opinion distribution for p~0:1 and p~0:8. Remember that the nature of the game passes from a
harmony game to public goods game dilemma at p~0:2. In D) and E), maps showing the opinion and strategy played in an instance of the game.
And in F) and G, in the background in grey the agents’ opinion for a realization for the game and the average opinion for 100 realizations as a
function of the agents’ degree k. In all cases E~1=2 and the sizes of the systems are N~1000 for all the systems except the 2D lattices that count
with 32|32~1024 agents. The networks are built with SkT&3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048916.g004
Figure 5. Effect of the introduction of zealots on the fraction of
collaborators fC shown in A) as function of p and on the
distribution of opinions for p~0:8 in B). The model is simulated
for a system of size N~1000, with E~1=2 and with random
interactions.
Opinion Dynamics and Evolution of Games
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updated by social pressure. In particular, for the game we have
selected a model based on the rules proposed in the Tragedy of
Commons by G. Hardin that allows us to explore two possible
final equilibria by tuning a single parameter p. For p below 0:2, the
rules of our system produce a scenario that reminds a harmony
game, while for pw0:2 a social dilemma equivalent to the public
goods game is found. For the opinion dynamics, we use the
Deffuant’s model that characterizes by having a continuous
opinion variable w and a bounded confidence mechanism
embodied by the parameter E. If the opinions of two agents are
further away than E, no interaction is possible. We take advantage
of the continuous nature of w to couple opinions and actions via a
mixed strategy scenario. The two available strategies C and D
become thus an action that is taken with certainty only in the limits
of opinion w 1 and{1, respectively. Any intermediate value of the
opinion can be translated into a probability of choosing C or D
with a bias towards the closest extreme in w.
Once the coupling of opinion and game dynamics is on, the
outcome of the game changes. Of course, the model is stochastic
and so a certain amount of dispersion in the main descriptive
variables is expected due to the inherent randomness. However,
variables such as the average fraction of collaborators or the
distribution of opinion reach fixed points in the dynamics different
from the de-coupled systems that reflect the constraints that
opinion and game payoff put on each other. This effect is
enhanced when the parameter is decreased imposing a more strict
bounded confidence regime. Cooperation can thus be increased
with a more social dynamics for the evolution of the strategies but
this is not the only feature that calls for attention in our results.
The presence of the variable of opinion allows the system to adapt
to different interaction topologies or to the existence of extremist
players in a very particular way. In correspondence to the
empirical observations, in the coupled model the fraction of
cooperators is not altered by the consideration of different
topologies or by the introduction of extremists. It is the opinion
distribution instead which is modified to absorb the impact of the
new conditions. In the experiments, this phenomenon was
explained by the presence of moody players that have into account
previous strategies when a new strategic decision was taken. In our
model this role is played by the memory effect that the opinion
variable provides. In this work, we have selected particularly
simple rules for the game and the opinion dynamics. In order to
gain further insights in the decision process of real players more
theoretical and experimental work is needed. Nevertheless, the
interplay between opinion and actions and the fact that the
opinion gets updated by social pressure can significantly modify
the scenario in evolutionary games.
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